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DIFFUSED SURFACE WATER IN ARKANSAS: IS IT TIME FOR A
NEW RULE?
J. W. Looney*
I. INTRODUCTION
Issues involving water have gained increased attention in Arkansas in
recent years. The legislature has addressed matters of water use and control
in every session since the drought of 1980. As a result, Arkansas has
considerably revised the rules relating to the use of water from streams and
groundwater management.' One area that has received less attention but
may be no less important relates to the control of diffused surface water.
Other than legislation providing for the organization and management of
drainage and levee districts2 and a few scattered enactments dealing with the
obstruction of watercourses, 3 it has been left to the courts to devise and to
apply rules of liability for activities associated with diffused surface water.
These controversies have been before the courts on a regular basis dating to
the last century and became more common as development--both agricultural and urban-progressed in the state.
Arkansas has traditionally followed the riparian rights doctrine
governing water rights. This doctrine, modified by statute in recent years,4
applies to water in watercourses, streams, and lakes. Separate rules govern
the rights of landowners to deal with diffused surface water not yet in a
watercourse. The statutory modifications of the riparian doctrine in Arkansas
carefully exclude diffused surface water from regulation.'
Further,
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Grateful appreciation is expressed to Steven Zraick for invaluable research assistance.
1. For a detailed review of these changes, see J. Looney, An Update on Arkansas
Water Law: Is the Riparian Doctrine Dead? 43 ARK. L. REV. 573 (1990); J. Looney,
Enhancing the Role of Water Districts in Groundwater Management and Surface Water
Utilization in Arkansas, 48 ARK. L. REV. 643 (1995).
2. See e.g., Irrigation, Drainage, and Watershed Improvement District Act, ARK. CODE
ANN. §§ 14-117-101 to -427 (Michie 1987 and Supp. 1995). See also Drainage and Levee
Improvement Districts, ARK. CODE ANN. §§ 14-120-101 to -705 (Michie 1987 and Supp.
1995); Drainage Improvement Districts, ARK. CODE ANN. §§ 14-121-101 to -1009 (Michie
1987 and Supp. 1995); Municipal Drainage Improvement Districts, ARK. CODE ANN. §§ 14122-101 to -211 (Michie 1987 and Supp. 1995); Levee Improvement Districts, ARK. CODE
ANN. §§ 14-123-201 to -507 (Michie 1987 and Supp. 1995).
3. See infra text accompanying notes 68-72 and part B.3.
4. See supra note 2.
5. See ARK. CODE ANN. § 15-22-202(3) (Michie 1994).
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legislation which establishes permit requirements for dam construction also
excludes dams designed to capture diffused surface water.6
Thus it has been left to the Arkansas courts to develop rules determining which water is considered to be in a watercourse and to adopt rules
dealing with diffused surface water. Issues related to these questions most
often come up in the context of three activities. First, a landowner may be
charged with responsibility for obstructing a watercourse through failure to
keep it clear or through the installation of man-made obstructions, such as
dams, which do not allow water to flow naturally. The landowner may
defend by asserting that the obstruction is not in a watercourse. Second, a
landowner may wish to collect and remove excess water from the land or
establish a drainage system for removal of water. Third, a landowner may
wish to prevent water from coming onto the property through the use of
dikes, levees, or similar structures or by changing the normal flowage to
prevent water from entering certain areas. In all such cases the extent to
which the landowner may achieve the goals or incur liability is dependent
on the answers to two basic questions which are the focus of this study, to
wit: what is a watercourse and what rules apply to diffused surface water?
II.

A.

WHAT IS A WATERCOURSE?

Definition

The Restatement (Second) of Torts defines watercourse as: "a stream
of water of natural origin, flowing constantly or recurrently on the surface
of the earth in a reasonably definite natural channel." 7 The term includes
"springs, lakes or marshes in which a stream originates or through which it
flows." '8
The question of what is a watercourse could also be asked conversely:
what is diffused surface water? The Restatement (Second) of Torts defines
surface water as "[w]ater from rain, melting snow, springs or seepage that
lies or flows on the surface of the earth but does not form a part of a
watercourse or lake." 9 Under this definition, it becomes necessary to
determine first whether a watercourse exists in order to define diffused
surface water.
The Arkansas courts have focused on this question in a variety of
contexts dating to the last century. For example, in an 1880 case, the
6. See ARK. CODE ANN. § 15-22-210-214 (Michie 1994).
7. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 841(1) (1979).
8. Id. at § 841(2).
9. Id. at § 846.
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Arkansas Supreme Court was called upon to determine liability of a railroad
for constructing a solid road-bed embankment across a natural drain.'0 The
court noted that no evidence had shown an obstruction of surface water but
that "Lye Branch was, by all the evidence, a stream with a defined bed, but
sluggish."''
One of the first expressions of a workable definition of watercourses
came in 1916 in Boone v. Wilson, 2 a dispute involving the accumulations
of "drift, mud, weeds and other matter" which diverted the flow of water
onto the plaintiffs' land. 13 They claimed this was an obstruction of a
watercourse and that the defendant was responsible for the resulting
damage.' 4 Although the court was not convinced that the drift was caused
by any "act of commission or any failure" on the part of the defendants, the
court had to determine whether the area in question constituted a watercourse to reach the final result.' 5 The court applied definitions of watercourse from an Idaho case and a California case. The Supreme Court of
Idaho defined water course as:
[A] stream of water flowing in a definite channel, having a bed and sides
or banks, and discharging itself into some other stream or body of water.
The flow of water need not be constant, but must be more than mere
surface drainage occasioned by extraordinary causes; there must be
substantial indications of the existence of a stream, which is ordinarily
a moving body of water. 6

The California Supreme Court said:
A water course is defined to be a running stream of water; a natural
stream, including rivers, creeks, runs, and rivulets. There must be a
stream, usually flowing in a particular direction, though it need not flow
continually. It may sometimes be dry. It must flow in a definite channel,
having a bed or banks, and usually discharges itself into some other
stream or body of water. It must be something more than a mere surface
drainage over the entire face of the tract of land, occasioned by unusual
freshets or other extraordinary causes."
10. St. Louis, I.M. & S. Ry. v. Morris, 35 Ark. 622, 623 (1880).
11. Id. at 626.
12. 125 Ark. 364, 188 S.W. 1160 (1916).
13. Id. at 366, 188 S.W. at 1161.
14. Id.
15. Id. at 368-72, 188 S.W. at 1162-63.
16. Id.at 368, 188 S.W.at 1162 (quoting Hutchinson v. Watson Slough Ditch Co., 101
P. 1059, 1061 (Idaho 1909)).
17. Boone, 125 Ark. at 368, 188 S.W. at 1162 (quoting Sanguinetti v. Pock, 69 P. 98,
100 (Cal. 1902)).
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In Boone, the watercourse in question was variously referred to as a
"ditch," an "old branch," and an "old channel."' 8 It had apparently been dug
9
out by a former owner for the purpose of straightening the channel.1 The
court indicated that the fact that "the water took the course of this ditch
instead of being confined in the former banks of the channel did not make
it any the less a natural water course. It was still a natural water course
though flowing, after the construction of this ditch, in artificial channels."2
In Leader v. Mathews 2' the court was called upon to apply the
definition from Boone to a situation involving water in a "slough" across
which the defendants had constructed a dam or levee. The dam was located
in an area described as a "draw, slash, depression or swale" known as Raft
Slough. Although no testifying witness could remember, the court found
that the area was probably the channel or course of a stream at one time.
However, now the area resembled a "long hole" or shallow "reservoir. ,22
The plaintiffs claimed it was a watercourse as defined in Boone.23 Water
sometimes flowed in the opposite direction toward a drainage ditch which
crossed the slough, and the evidence showed that Raft Slough would not
operate as a drainage canal unless additional ditches were cut for flow of the
water. 24 A part of the bed of the depression was in cultivation. 25 Given all
these facts, the court was not convinced that the slough met the definition
of watercourse.2 6
The matter of watercourse determination was before the court again in
the 1950s. In Turner v. Smith2 7 the defendant had constructed a rectangular
reservoir some one and three-quarters of a mile long and a mile wide for
duck hunting. 8 The levee around the reservoir was about three feet high,
and the plaintiffs claimed it obstructed natural watercourses. 29 The court
applied the definition of watercourse from Boone to find that at least two
natural watercourses had been obstructed by the levee. 3" The north levee
crossed Short Bayou which had a clearly visible channel at its point of
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.

Id. at 369-70, 188 S.W. at 1162-63.
Id. at 369, 188 S.W. at 1163.
Id. at 370, 188 S.W. at 1163.
192 Ark 1049, 1050, 95 S.W.2d 1138 (1936).
Id. at 1050-51, 95 S.W.2d at 1139.
Id. at 1050, 95 S.W.2d at 1138-39.
Id. at 1051, 95 S.W.2d at 1139.
Leader, 192 Ark. at 1053, 95 S.W.2d at 1140.
Id. at 1054, 95 S.W.2d at 1140.
217 Ark. 441, 231 S.W.2d 110 (1950).
Id. at 442, 231 S.W.2d at 111.
Id. at 442-43, 231 S.W.2d at 111-12.
Id. at 443, 231 S.W.2d at 112.
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entry.3 The bayou flattened in the nearly level timberland, but did "flow
sluggishly" toward the southeast until it "reappeared" as a stream with well
defined banks.32 Similarly, Fish Lake Bayou entered the property and
temporarily "fingered out" to become a "marsh" or "scatters" before
reappearing as a bayou.33 The court said that "[t]he fact that these streams
temporarily flattened out and flowed without well defined banks did not
destroy their character as watercourses, nor did this fact deprive the
appellees of their right to insist that the water's flow be unimpeded."34
According to the court, a watercourse may "spread out 35and become
sluggish" at intervals without being reduced to surface water.
In the 1953 case of Stacy v. Walker 6 the court addressed the question
of whether a flowage area was a defined waterway.37 The area involved was
described as a slight depression into which rainfall flowed and then followed
a natural contour which created a bog with no outlet when blocked by
defendant's levee. 38 The court applied the rule from Leader v. Matthews
and indicated that water flowing into low places "do[es] not necessarily
constitute a watercourse. 39
In another 1953 case, an area contended to be a natural water course
had been used for fourteen to fifteen years as a rice farm.40 The plaintiffs'
witness described the area as a "sway" that was nearly flat.4 1 Drainage
from higher land to the east converged to form a well-defined stream.42
However, when the stream reached the flat lands west of the ridge, it left its
banks and spread over the flat lands.43 It followed the lowest portions,
eventually reaching the L'Anguille River after a well-defined channel
reappeared.' The depression was some 100 to 400 feet wide and 5000 feet
long. 45 The defendants had constructed a levee or dike which prevented any
of the water from crossing their property. 6 The fact that the land had been
31. Id. at 444, 231 S.W.2d at 112. The channel was discernible on aerial photographs
and described by witnesses. Id.
32. Turner, 217 Ark. at 444, 231 S.W.2d at 112.
33. Id.
34. Id. at 444, 231 S.W.2d at 112.
35. Id.
36. 222 Ark. 819, 262 S.W.2d 889 (1953).
37. Id. at 820, 262 S.W.2d at 889.
38. Id. at 822, 262 S.W.2d at 890.
39. Id. (citing Leader v. Matthews, 192 Ark. at 1053, 95 S.W.2d at 1140).
40. Reddmann v. Reddmann, 221 Ark. 727, 728, 732, 255 S.W.2d 668, 669-70 (1953).
41. Id. at 731, 255 S.W.2d at 669.
42. Id. at 731, 255 S.W2d at 670.
43. Id.
44. Id.
45. Id.
46. Id. at 729-30, 255 S.W.2d at 669.
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used for fourteen or fifteen years for rice production destroyed the notion
that it was a natural water course.47 Quoting the lower court, the Arkansas
Supreme Court reiterated that "'the most that can be said is that in the case
of overflows, or excessive rains, the water naturally follows the contour of
the land, and if unobstructed would recede over this "sway," as indicated by
plaintiffs' witness.""
In Solomon v. Congleton49 the court applied the Boone definition of a
watercourse to a slough, but the court first attempted to define slough.5"
Using a standard dictionary definition of slough, the court found Power
Slough to be a natural drain. 51 Citing Turner v. Smith, the court indicated
that the fact that the slough may have intermittently flattened out and flowed
without well-defined banks did not destroy its character as a watercourse.52
Finding the slough to be more like that in Turner, the court awarded the
plaintiff injunctive relief but denied damages from the existence of the
obstruction.53
In a more recent review, the court in Boyd v. Greene County 5"refused
to find the existence of a watercourse because the water involved was "mere
surface drainage from neighboring rice fields and/or rainfall.""
The
plaintiffs argued that the source of water was immaterial and the fact that
the water was mere surface drainage did not preclude a finding that a
watercourse existed. 6 However, the court refused to adopt this view. "
The court noted that the water followed the contour of the land in the
vicinity and flowed onto the defendant's land because that was the low
ground in the vicinity. Particularly persuasive was the fact that the water
never flowed in a definite channel with a bed and banks.59 The court quoted

47. Id. at 732-33, 255 S.W.2d at 670.
48. Id. at 733, 255 S.W.2d at 670.
49. 245 Ark. 487, 432 S.W.2d 865 (1968).
50. Id. at 488-89, 432 S.W.2d at 866.
51. Id. at 489-90, 432 S.W.2d at 866. The court said slough means "[a] depression in
a prairie, often dry, forming part of the natural-drainage system: sometimes deeply miry, [or]
[a] stagnant swamp or reedy inlet, small bayou, water-channel, or pond in which water backs
up, or which is filled by freshets." Id. at 489, 432 S.W.2d at 866 (quoting FUNK &
WAGNALL'S NEW STANDARD DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE (1961)).

52.
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.
59.

Id. at 491, 432 S.W.2d at 867.
Id. at 492, 432 S.W.2d at 867-68.
7 Ark. App. 110, 644 S.W.2d 615 (1983).
Id. at 113, 644 S.W.2d at 617.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 115, 644 S.W.2d at 618.
Id. at 113, 644 S.W.2d at 617.
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1890 case, St. Louis, Iron Mountain & Southern Railway
at length from an
60
Co. v. Ramsey:
The banks of a river are those elevations of land which confine the
waters when they rise out of the bed; and the bed is that soil so usually
covered by water as to be distinguishable from the bank by the character
of the soil, or vegetation, or both, produced by the common presence and
action of flowing water. But neither the line of ordinary high-water mark,
nor of ordinary low-water mark, nor of a middle stage of water, can be
assumed as the line dividing the bed from the banks. This line is to be
found by examining the bed and banks, and ascertaining where the
presence and action of water are so common and usual, and so long
continued in all ordinary years, as to mark upon the soil of the bed a
character distinct from that of the banks, in respect to vegetation, as well
as in respect to the nature of the soil itself. Whether this line between the
bed and the banks will be found above or below, or at a middle stage of
water, must depend upon the character of the stream.... But in all cases
the bed of a river is a natural object, and is to be sought for, not merely
by the application of any abstract rules, but as other natural objects are
sought for and found, by the distinctive appearances they present; the
banks being fast land, on which vegetation, appropriate to such land in
the particular locality, grows wherever the bank is not too steep to permit
such growth, and the bed being soil of a different character and having
no vegetation, or only such as exists when commonly submerged by
water.6

The court found this definition to be applicable to the determination of
whether a watercourse existed.62
B. Implications of a Finding of "Watercourse"
A number of implications flow from a decision that a particular area is
a watercourse. First, all rules for allocation and use of water under the
riparian rights system are applicable. This means, primarily, that the rights
of the owner of land next to the watercourse to use the water or of others
who use water from the watercourse will be determined by application of
the riparian rights concept of "reasonable use." Second, the state has
imposed permit requirements for dam construction in watercourses along
with other statutory restrictions. Third, a number of prohibitions on what
60. 53 Ark. 314, 13 S.W. 931 (1890).
61. Boyd, 7 Ark. App. at 113-14, 644 S.W.2d at 617-18 (quoting Ramsey, 53 Ark. at

322-23, 13 S.W. at 933).
62. Id. at 114, 644 S.W.2d at 618.
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can be done in damming, filling or otherwise preventing flow come into
play. Particular statutes govern the responsibility of landowners in keeping
watercourses open and free from obstructions. Both criminal and civil
liability may be involved.
1.

Riparian Rights and Use of Water from Watercourses

In 1955 Arkansas formally adopted the riparian rights concept of
reasonable use in Harris v. Brooks.63 The basic tenet of the riparian rights
doctrine is that the right to use water from a stream or lake is restricted to
those who are riparian to the water source. This right is restricted in volume
to a reasonable amount with respect to the purposes for which the water is
to be used on the riparian land. As stated by the Arkansas Supreme Court,
[w]hen one lawful use of water interferes with or detracts from another
lawful use, then a question arises as to whether, under all the facts and
circumstances of that particular case, the interfering use shall be declared
unreasonable and as such enjoined, or whether a reasonable and equitable
adjustment should be made, having due regard to the reasonable rights
of each.'
The concept of reasonableness is the essence of the riparian doctrine.
However, this approach applies only to the use of water from streams and
lakes and has not been used with regard to diffused surface water. Thus, a
status determination of a particular flow of water as being a watercourse
implicates the entire system of water allocation built around the riparian
rights concept.
Arkansas has dealt with issues involving water shortages by enacting
legislation aimed at modifying certain aspects of the riparian rights doctrine.
For example, the Arkansas Soil and Water Conservation Commission
(ASWCC) has statutory authority to allocate scarce water during periods of
shortage.6" The agency also operates a registration system for diversions of
water from streams. The agency has adopted rules to implement this
authority which detail the processes for registration of use and for allocation
decisions.
These rules attempt to incorporate legislative intent as to which water
is subject to registration for diversion and subject to allocation.66 The rules
63. 255 Ark. 436, 283 S.W.2d 129 (1955).
64. Id. at 445, 283 S.W.2d at 134.
65. ARK. CODE ANN. §§ 15-22-205(3) to -217 (Michie 1994).
66. ARKANSAS SOIL & WATER CONSERVATION COMMISSION,
UTILIZATION OF SURFACE WATER

(1989) [hereinafter

RULES].

RULES

FOR

THE
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exclude from the registration requirement diversions of diffused surface
water.67 They also exclude from the allocation process various categories
of use, including water diverted from intermittent streams and diffused
surface water.68 Intermittent streams are those "whose flow is seasonal in
nature and does not flow continuously. '69 The exclusion is a practical one
because such streams would likely contain no water during periods of
shortage when the allocation rules come into play. These streams may have
been excluded because they would not be considered watercourses under the
riparian doctrine. However, the definition used would not definitely exclude
such streams from the ordinary definition of watercourse.7 °
The rules define diffused surface water somewhat differently than the
statutes. The legislation establishing the allocation authority defined
diffused surface water as that "occurring naturally on the surface of the
ground other than in natural channels, lakes or ponds." 7' The rules expand
that definition to include water on the surface of the ground "other than in
natural or altered stream channels, lakes or ponds."7"
Under either
definition, water that is not in streams is excluded from the registration and
allocation rules. Both the legislation and rules define stream as excluding
73
a "depression, swale, or gully, through which diffused water floWS.
2.

Dam Permit Legislation

In 1957 the legislature adopted requirements making a permit necessary
in order to construct or own a dam for any purpose.74 This legislation
established certain restrictions on the permit's issuance directed toward
safety and concern for downstream riparian owners whose water use could
be adversely affected by the structure's presence. The legislation further
sought to protect fish and wildlife dependent on the sufficient flow of the
water. Any impoundment must be only for "surplus" surface water and
constructed in a manner that allows discharge of a quantity necessary to
protect the rights of lower riparian owners, fish, and wildlife.7
67. RULES, supra note 66, at 302.2(c).
68. RULES, supra note 66, at 307.2(e), (f).
69. RULES, supra note 66, at 301.3(u).
70. Once sufficient stream flow data is available, such streams may be defined by a
statistical method. See RULES, supra note 66, notation accompanying 301.3(u).
71. ARK. CODE ANN. § 15-22-202(3) (Michie 1994).
72. RULES, supra note 66, and accompanying text.
73. ARK CODE ANN. § 15-22-202(10) (Michie 1994); RULES, supra note 66, at 301.3
(Jj).
74. ARK. CODE ANN. §§ 15-22-210 to -214 (Michie 1994).
75. Id. at § 15-22-210(1).
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Excluded from the permit requirements are dams that impound less than
fifty acre feet of water or are of a height less than twenty-five feet. Also
exempt are dams built below the stream's ordinary high water mark.76
Clearly, the legislative intent is to require permits only when construction
is in a stream. Thus, the permit requirement would not apply to the typical
farm pond which catches only diffused surface water. The height exclusion
reinforces this interpretation.
3.

Obstruction of Watercourses

In addition to the authorization of construction of dams as outlined
above and the careful attempt to assure that no lower owner would be
affected by the presence of the dam, Arkansas has prohibited the obstruction
of watercourses through legislation dating back to the nineteenth century.
For example, the law prohibits the blocking of a river, creek, or other
watercourse unless the "free and easy passage of all fish ascending or
descending the watercourse"77 is provided from March 1 to June 1 each
year. Mills and manufacturers apparently must provide this passage
throughout the year."8 Dams or other obstructions must be kept open so as
to allow a sufficient flow of water to maintain fish life below the obstruction.79 In both cases a violation of the statute is a misdemeanor.
Three separate statutes make obstructing the flow of water with timber,
tree trunks, or tree limbs a misdemeanor. One prohibits leaving these items
in any "navigable stream, drainage ditch or stream bed of any drainage
project." 80 Another extends this prohibition to any "ditch, drain, stream, or
canal, whether natural or artificial" and includes not only timber and trees
but also "material to be filled or thrown into" any of the above. 8' The third
statute simply outlaws the obstruction of a "natural drain" without defining
what is intended and, interestingly, excludes Lee, Woodruff, Phillips, and
Craighead counties.82
In addition to the potential criminal liability for the obstruction of
watercourses, civil liability may be imposed as well. In fact, in the broad
obstruction statute referred to earlier, an "interested" person (including levee
76. Id. at § 15-22-214(b).
77. ARK. CODE ANN. § 15-44-110(a) (Michie 1994).
78. Id. at (a)(l).
79. Id. at § 5-72-107(a) (Michie 1993).
80. Id. at § 5-72-104.
81. Id. at § 5-72-105.
82. Id. § 5-72-106. This statute is inapplicable to a levee district's actions in
constructing levees to protect property within its territory. See St. Louis, I.M. & S. Ry. v.
Board of Directors, 103 Ark. 127, 145 S.W. 892 (1921).
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and drainage districts) may remove the obstruction and sue the person
causing the obstruction for the costs associated with removing it.83
Aside from these statutory prohibitions, one who obstructs a water-84
course can be liable for doing so under a nuisance theory. Taylor v. Rudy
is instructive on this point. In Taylor the defendant built dams on a nonnavigable stream, which caused it to back up onto the plaintiffs property.
The court upheld the granting of equitable relief in the form of a permanent
injunction. Similarly, in a number of the cases reviewed above dealing with
the definition of watercourse, the courts, upon finding that a watercourse
existed, granted relief. For example, in Turner v. Smith 5 the construction
of a levee enclosing a shallow reservoir obstructed a natural watercourse and
damaged adjacent landowners' property. The court upheld an award of
damages for crop destruction and a decree that openings should be cut in the
banks to allow passage of water. Likewise, the court in Solomon v.
Congleton86 interpreted a chancellor's finding of a natural drain to be a
finding that a watercourse existed and upheld a decree that required the
removal of a levee. However, not all such actions have been successful.
For example, in Boone v. Wilson87 the accumulation of drift, mud, weeds
and other matter in watercourses causing overflow was found not to have
been caused by the defendant but rather "produced by the natural flow of
the waters of the stream" and the defendant could not have prevented this
obstruction except by an "unreasonable consumption of time and expenditure
88
of money which was not required of him.,
Although most of these cases dealt with the rights of others to be free
of nuisance for the actions of one landowner in obstructing a watercourse,
liability may, of course, also result from the interference with riparian rights.
As indicated above in Harrisv. Brooks, the test is one of reasonableness.89
III. RULES OF LIABILITY FOR INTERFERENCE WITH DIFFUSED SURFACE
WATER

When one landowner takes action to deal with diffused surface water,
either to prevent it from coming onto lower lying land or to remove excess
water from the land, neighboring property owners may complain of damage
83.
84.
85.
86.
87.
88.
89.

ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-72-105(b) (Michie 1994).
99 Ark. 128, 137 S.W. 574 (1911).
217 Ark. 441, 231 S.W.2d 110 (1950).
245 Ark. 487, 432 S.W.2d 865 (1968).
125 Ark. 364, 188 S.W. 1160 (1916).
Id. at 372, 188 S.W. at 1163.
See supra note 63.
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to their property. To determine the liability arising from such actions, courts
have applied one of five rules. Actually, only three rules are involved, but
two have been modified substantially so that the modified versions may now
be considered separate rules. The traditional approaches were referred to as
the "common enemy" rule and the "civil law" or "natural servitude" rule.
Both are approaches growing out of concepts of the rights of property
owners. Both have been subject to various exceptions or qualifications.
These exceptions or variations may be considered separate rules and are
usually referred to as the "modified common enemy" rule and the "modified
civil law" rule. In addition, a growing number of courts apply a tort
concept of "reasonable use" to determine liability.
A.

Common Enemy Rule

In its pure formulation this property rule suggests that diffused surface
water may be treated as a common enemy and that a property owner may
take whatever steps necessary to protect against it. The concept has its
greatest validity in guarding against floodwaters or waters from the sea. The
rule has less justification when applied to situations involving mere drainage
of surface water, but is still applied by some courts particularly in urban
areas. Applied in its pure form the rule would permit a landowner to
construct dams, walls, levees, or ditches to prevent water from coming onto
the property and would allow a property owner to fill, level, and drain
property without responsibility for resulting damage to neighboring property.
The origin of the concept is uncertain, but is sometimes attributed to
concepts in English law dealing with water from the sea.9' In its pure form
it was first applied, although not by name, in the United States in Luther v.
Winnisimmet,9' an 1851 Massachusetts case. The term common enemy was
93 an
not used until 1875 in a New Jersey case. 92 Gannon v. Hargaedon,
1865 Massachusetts case, set forth the standard rule in full.
As indicated, some courts continue to apply the rule in urban areas
although it has been substantially modified in most agricultural areas. The
justification for the rule arises from an absolutist concept of property rights
90. See Stanley V. Kinyon and Robert C. McClure, Interferences With Surface Waters,
24 MINN. L. REV. 891, 899 (1940) [hereinafter Kinyon and McClure].
91. 63 Mass. 171 (1851). See also Charles L. Snodgrass and Lawrence 0. Davis, The
Law of Surface Water in Missouri, 24 Mo. L. REV. 137 (1959) (Part 1) and 24 Mo. L. REV.
281 (1959) (Part 2) [hereinafter Snodgrass and Davis].
92. Town of Union v. Dukes, 38 N.J. 21 (1875) (cited in Snodgrass and Davis, supra
note 91, at 150 n.72).
93. 92 Mass. 106 (1865) (cited in Snodgrass and Davis, supra note 91, at 150 n.73 and
Kinyon and McClure, supra note 90).
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that give rise to the idea that an owner may take whatever actions deemed
necessary to utilize his or her property.
B.

Civil Law or Natural Servitude Rule

In its pure form, the civil law or natural servitude rule is the exact
opposite of the common enemy rule. The civil law rule suggests that a
property owner may take no action to disturb the natural drainage of water
and must accept water which comes onto the property as a servitude. This
concept arises from an idea that "water flows as it is wont to flow" and
should not be disturbed.
The adoption of the rule in the United States is traced to early cases in
Louisiana. 94 Because Louisiana generally followed civil law, the rule was,
perhaps inappropriately, denominated as the civil law rule. Other courts
followed the Louisiana approach without actually recognizing the rule as a
civil law concept. The first court to do so outside Louisiana was Martin v.
Riddle,95 in an 1848 Pennsylvania case. In its pure form, the civil law rule
may not, in fact, represent the actual state of the civil law as later adopted
in Louisiana.9 6
C.

Modified Common Enemy Rule

The pure common enemy rule was not long retained by many courts
because of the harshness of the result. In fact, a number of courts indicated
they were adopting the common enemy concept, but immediately modified
it by adding qualifications that would impose liability if the landowner acted
negligently in actions taken to protect the property or in ridding the property
of excess water that resulted in harm to neighboring property. This
modification permitted courts to evaluate the property owner's actions to
determine if they caused "unnecessary harm." Certainly, the collection and
discharge of the water onto neighboring property through artificial means
might be considered negligent, and, if it caused unnecessary harm, liability
would be imposed. Acceleration of water flow by artificial means, such as
ditches, would also appear to violate the principle.

94. Orleans Nay. Co. v. Mayor of New Orleans, 2 Mart. 214 (La. 1812),followed by
Martin v. Jett, 12 La. 501 (1838) and Lattimore v. Davis, 14 La. 161 (1939) (cited in
Snodgrass and Davis, supra note 91, at 148 n.57).
95. 26. Pa. 415 (1848) (cited in Kinyon and McClure, supra, note 90, at 895 n.12).
96. See 2 WATERS AND WATER RIGHTS, § 10.0 1(b)(2), at 37 (Robert E. Beck, ed., 2d
ed. 1991)).
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Modified Civil Law Rule

The civil law rule in its pure form would inhibit development and
improvement of land. In urban areas particularly, this rigid rule would have
led to unjust results because it placed the entire liability on one owner. As
a result, a number of courts stated allegiance to the civil law rule, but
modified it by applying a reasonableness test to the conduct of the one who
altered a natural drainage system. This was sometimes done by recognizing
specific exceptions to the rule. For example, the so-called "natural
watercourse" exception allowed an upper landowner to alter the natural
water flow, so long as it remained in the natural drainage system when it
passed to a lower landowner. An upper landowner could collect the water
at one point and increase the flow, provided the flow was into a natural
watercourse. "Unreasonable injury" would have to result in order for
liability to be imposed. The lower landowner was also subject to a
reasonableness test for any actions undertaken to obstruct the water flow
coming onto the lower property.
E.

Reasonable Use Rule

As courts began to graft limitations onto the two basic property
oriented rules, the outcomes in cases seemed to be indistinguishable. As
stated by one court:
This convergence of the two theories has been aptly described as creating
a situation in which "the civil-law owner may never drain his land
except by following the natural drainage, but the common-enemy owner
may always drain his land except that he may not use artificial channels.
The civil-law owner may never obstruct the natural flow of surface
waters unless he acts reasonably, while the common-enemy
owner may
97
always obstruct the flow if he acts reasonably.
The effect of the modifications was to bring tort-type concepts into the
analysis and to depart from the rigid application of the property oriented
rules. 98 However, some courts chose to adopt a third rule instead of using
tort concepts to overlay the property rules. This rule embraces the concept
of reasonable use. The reasonable use rule determines liability by consideration of all relevant circumstances. Liability is determined by the reason97. Butler v. Bruno, 341 A.2d 735, 739 (R.I. 1975) (quoting Frank E. Maloney and
Sheldon J. Plager, Diffused Surface Water: Scourge or Bounty? 8 NAT. RESOURCES J. 72
(1968)).
98. Id. at 739.

1996]

SURFACE WATER

ableness of the property owner's actions who altered the surface water flow.
That is, the consequential harm to another's use and enjoyment of his
property is evaluated to see if the result of the alterer's activity was
unreasonable. This is, of course, not unlike the tort of nuisance. In fact, the
Restatement (Second) of Torts endorses the reasonable use test and
specifically recognizes it as a form of nuisance.99 The same rules of liability
are involved as for any invasion of the right to the use and enjoyment of
property. The activity may be either the backing up of surface water or the
increase in flow; if the interference is unreasonable, liability is imposed.
One commentator has summarized the factors that courts have
considered in determining whether alteration of natural drainage is
reasonable as follows:
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)
(6)
(7)
(8)
(9)
(10)
(11)

The injury to neighboring land;
The benefit to the drained land;
The burden on either party in ameliorating the injury;
The extent of change to the drainage system;
The necessity for changing the drainage system;
The motive for changing the drainage system;
The foreseeability of impact on neighboring lands;
Justice and other social values;
The location of the lands;
The extent and intended effect of any public authorization; and
The protection of existing values.100

The reasonable use rule was first mentioned in Sweet v. Cutts,'' an
1870 New Hampshire case. Since then it has emerged as the dominant
approach in determining liability, in part because of its flexibility. 0 2 Its
flexibility is both its greatest strength and a major weakness. In a frequently
cited opinion of the Rhode Island court in which the majority adopted the
reasonable use rule, the dissenting justice criticized the need for a factual
determination in each case. He said, "[b]ecause I believe that the proposed
factual test is no 'rule' at all and that it fails to provide a landowner any
reasonably certain standards governing the use of his land, I respectfully

99. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 833 (1965).
100. 2 WATERS AND WATER RIGHTS, supra note 96, § 10.03(b)(3) at 47-48. The factors

are arranged according to the number of states where one or more of the factors have been
mentioned.
101. 50 N.H. 439 (1870) (cited in Snodgrass and Davis, supra note 91 at 152 n.82).
102. See 2 WATERS AND WATER RIGHTS, supra note 96, §10.03(b)(3) at 44-45.
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dissent."'' 0 3 The majority anticipated this criticism and indicated that the
property-based rules, as modified, failed to afford any more predictability
than the reasonable use rule."°
IV. WHAT RULES APPLY TO DIFFUSED SURFACE WATER IN ARKANSAS?

In Arkansas, the liability of a landowner in dealing with the flow of
water across lands was clearly addressed for the first time in Little Rock and
Fort Smith Railway Co. v. Chapman,'0 5 an 1882 case involving the
construction of an elevated embankment and roadway which caused water
to stand on the premises of the plaintiff. The Arkansas court had addressed
10 6
a related issue two years earlier in St. L.I.M. & S. Railway Co. v. Willis,
approving jury instructions that referred to obstruction of the natural flow
and injury by overflowing as a basis for liability when it resulted from
failure to construct a road-bed in a skillful and careful manner. However,
the Willis court did not deal with any specific rules regarding liability.
In Chapman the court analyzed in some detail the conflicting rules for
dealing with surface water, a matter which the court said had not been
settled in the state. The court then proceeded to adopt a modified version
of the common enemy
rule, which the court repeatedly referred to as the
"common law" rule. 107
In rejecting the possible applicability of the civil law rule, the court
indicated that it did not feel authorized to depart from common law rules of
decision except to the extent that changes, modifications, or qualifications
"must legitimately have resulted from the application of old principles to
new conditions, or the refusal to apply them to conditions to which they are
not applicable."'0 8 The court then quoted the reception statute: "By statute
the common law of England, as it existed prior to the fourth year of James
I, is made the rule of decision in this State, so far as the same is of a
general nature and applicable to our condition."' 10 9
The court then analyzed the approach in other states and concluded that
the common enemy doctrine "clothed with qualifications" was the better rule
because the decisions finding an unqualified right to deal with surface
waters did not "commend themselves to our sense of justice""' nor seem to
103.
104.
105.
106.
107.

Butler, supra note 97, at 741 (Joslin, J., dissenting).
Butler, supra note 97, at 741 (Joslin, J., dissenting).
39 Ark. 463 (1882).
35 Ark. 626 (1880).
Chapman, 39 Ark. at 474.

108.
109.
110.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 480.
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be in accordance with "the maxim of law so often quoted, and which is but
a paraphrase of the golden rule of the Christian,""' apparently referring to
the maxim, sic utere tuo ut alienum non loedas. i
While adopting a modification of the unqualified right, the court
suggested the test was whether in making improvements the owner acted "in
good faith" and "with no purpose of abridging or interfering with any of
their neighbor's rights.""' 3 If the improvements "necessarily do damage" to
the neighboring land, the maxim is not infringed." 4
When applied to the facts, the court felt the railroad had constructed the
roadbed with insufficient drains. The resulting damage was "unnecessary,
and was not the result of a fair and proper exercise of its franchise."' '" The
court said, "It was not reasonable that it should render so much property
useless, when it might so easily have prevented it without detriment to its
operations. ' 16 Chapman has been cited, almost without exception, in later
cases as the basis for the adoption of a modified common enemy rule in
Arkansas.
Later Arkansas courts applied the Chapman approach to a variety of
situations. For example, in Baker v. Allen 1 7 the court applied the Chapman
analysis to find that a levee established across a "slight, but broad,
depression" along which surface water drained from lands of upper owners
would not be grounds for damages if it was the "only practical method of
protecting" the lands." 8 Similarly, Jackson v. Keller"9 involved a lower
proprietor who constructed a dam or levee across low "swaggy" places to
protect his property from water he claimed the upper proprietor collected in
drainage ditches and sent to the lower land at a greater volume than the
natural drainage system provided.'
The court indicated that the upper
proprietor had no right to concentrate the water and "throw it by ditches
with greater force and volume than it otherwise would have gone."''
And,
I1. Id.
112. Chapman, 39 Ark. at 476. The phrase means to use your property so as not to
injure the rights of another. Id.
113. Id. at 480.
114. Id. (quoting from a note that had been written about Sweet v. Cutts, supra note 101,
that, interestingly enough, adopted the reasonable use test, not a modified version of the
common enemy doctrine).
115. Id. at 481.
116. Id.
117. 66 Ark. 271, 50 S.W. 511 (1899).
118. Id. at 276, 50 S.W. at 512-13 (suggesting that the obstruction must be unnecessary
for liability to be imposed).
119. 95 Ark. 242, 129 S.W. 296 (1910).
120. Id. at 242-43, 129 S.W. at 296.
121. Id,at 245, 129 S.W. at 297.
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while the lower proprietor had a duty to control the water that came upon
his land in natural flow by ditches instead of by the embankment, if he
"could have done so at reasonable expense" and if the ditches "could have
been made as effectual" as the embankment, he was not liable for doing so
as the "only practical method of protecting his land."' 2 The court did not
cite Chapman as authority but did cite Baker.'23
Some uncertainty regarding the application of the Chapman rule when
dealing with floodwaters, as opposed to usual runoff from rainfall, arose in
McCoy v. Board of Directors of Plum Bayou Levee District. 124 In McCoy,
the court dealt with the question of whether a levee could be constructed
across "depressions, swales, and low places" so as to prevent floodwater
from a river from entering lowlands. 25 The court also considered whether
the landowners between the levee and the river should be compensated for
any damages resulting from the higher level of water caused by the levee.'26
The court declined to identify the floodwater as surface water but said it was
treated as a common enemy which could be defended against without
liability "unless injury is unnecessarily inflicted upon another, which by
reasonable effort and expense could be avoided."'' 27 In addition to
2
Chapman, the court cited with approval cases from Mississippi,
California, 29 and Iowa, 3 ° which suggested that floodwater should not be
treated the same as surface water and that an unqualified common enemy
approach would be appropriate.' 3 ' However, in Leader v. Mathews 32 the
court suggested that floodwaters could be "overflow" waters or "surface
water."' 33 The Leader court held that the common enemy rule gave the
owner the right to protect against floodwaters in either case unless the owner
"unnecessarily injure[d] or damage[d] another for his own protection."' 34

122. Id.
123. Id. (citing Baker v. Allen, 66 Ark. 271, 50 S.W. 511 (1899). See supra text
accompanying notes 117-18 for consideration of Baker. See also Brasko v. Prislovsky, 207
Ark. 1034, 183 S.W.2d 925 (1944); Honey v. Bertig Co., 202 Ark. 370, 150 S.W.2d 214
(1941) and Leader v. Mathews, 192 Ark. 1049, 95 S.W.2d 1138 (1936).
124. 95 Ark. 345, 129 S.W. 1097 (1910).
125. Id. at 349, 129 S.W. at 1099.
126. Id.
127. Id.
128. Kansas City, M. & B. R.R. v. Smith, 17 So. 78 (Miss. 1895).
129. Lamb v. Reclamation Dist., 14 P. 625 (Cal. 1887).
130. Hoard v. Des Moines, 17 N.W. 527 (Iowa 1883).
131. McCoy, 95 Ark. at 349-52, 129 S.W. at 1099.
132. 192 Ark. 1049, 95 S.W.2d 1138 (1936).
133. Id. at 1053, 95 S.W.2d at 1140.
134. Id. at 1140. See also Brasko v. Prislovsky, 207 Ark. 1034, 183 S.W.2d 925 (1944)
and Honey v. Bertig Co., 202 Ark. 370, 150 S.W.2.d 214 (1941).
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In Dent v. Alexander135 the court addressed an issue involving not the
damming or preventing of flow but rather the diversion of flow that was
alleged to be accelerated onto the plaintiffs property in an unnatural
channel.136 To determine any resulting liability, the court did not concern
itself with whether the upper landowner had accelerated the flow of water
onto the lower landowner's property. Rather, the court considered only
whether any damage resulted from the upper landowner's actions. 37 To
38
establish this test, the court relied on a Utah case, Bohn v. Salt Lake City.
There, the Utah Supreme Court said:
A landowner incurs no liability by reason of the fact that surface water
falling or running onto his land flows thence to the property of others in
its natural manner. But he may not use or improve his land in such a
way as to increase the total volume of surface water which flows from
it to adjacent property, or as to discharge it or any part of it upon such
property in a manner different in volume or course from its natural flow,
to the substantial damage of the owner of that property.'39
The right of a landowner to fill to prevent the flow of surface water
outside urban areas was reaffirmed in Timmons v. Clayton."4 The court
qualified this right by requiring that the lower proprietor, in constructing the
levee, "acts in good faith and is free of negligence."''
However, the court
seemed to regard the same right in an urban area to be close to absolute.' 42
The court cited with approval the earlier case of Levy v. Nash,'43 which held
that an owner has a right to fill lower property, to elevate it, to construct
ditches or otherwise "to protect it against the surface water from an
44
adjoining lot" as a "necessary incident to the ownership of such property.'
According to the court, 'to find contrary would "operate against the
' 45
advancement and progress of cities and towns . . . against public policy.'
Levy did not qualify the right to deal with surface water in urban areas.
135. 218 Ark. 277, 235 S.W.2d 953 (1951).
136. Id. at 278, 235 S.W.2d at 953.
137. Id. at 281, 235 S.W.2d at 955.
138. 8 P.2d 591 (Utah 1932).
139. Id. at 280, 235 S.W.2d at 954-55. See also Lee-Phillips Drainage Dist. v. Beaver
Bayou Drainage Dist., 226 Ark. 105, 289 S.W.2d 192 (1956); Stacy v. Walker, 222 Ark. 819,
262 S.W.2d 889 (1953) and Reddman v. Reddmann, 221 Ark. 727, 255 S.W.2d 668 (1953).
140. 222 Ark. 327, 259 S.W.2d 501 (1953).
141. Id. at 331, 259 S.W.2d at 503.
142. Id. at 330-31, 259 S.W.2d at 503.
143. 87 Ark. 41, 112 S.W. 173 (1908).
144. Timmons, 222 Ark. at 331, 259 S.W.2d at 503 (quoting Levy, 87 Ark. at 44, 112
S.W. at 174).
145. Id.
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However, the court in Timmons seemed to suggest that the test whether the
landowner was acting negligently or in bad faith, should apply to activities
in rural settings' 46 and, apparently, left the Levy approach intact for urban
lands.
The court has had rare occasions to apply the liability rule in recent
years. Each time it is mentioned the court reaffirms the original Chapman
concept. In Solomon v. Congleton'47 the court recognized a lower
proprietor's right to fend off surface water.14 8 In Smith v. Cruthis149 the
court cited Solomon and held that parties dealing with surface water could0
'5
"build flumes and levees on their own lands to fend off surface waters."'
More recently, in Pirtle v. Opco, Inc.,"'5 the court restated the Chapman rule
and indicated that the right must be exercised with "due care so as not to
inflict injury on a neighboring landowner 'beyond what may be fairly
necessary."",152 In Pirtle, apparently for the first time, the court imposed
liability because the defendant "went beyond what would be considered
fairly necessary in preventing surface waters from coming on to his
property."' 53 The court was influenced by the defendant's own testimony
that he was not concerned about the effect of his actions on the neighboring
property.1 54 In Chism v. Tipton.55 the court applied a "disproportionate
prejudice to another" test and permitted a levee to be maintained across an
area which was not found to be a natural stream or watercourse. 5 6 Most
recently, in Boyd v. Greene County,'57 the court reviewed the nineteenthcentury cases which adopted the common law rule, as modified, and held
that if no watercourse existed, the Chapman rule applied.' 58

146. Id. at 330-31, 259 S.W.2d at 503. Although the land in Timmons was inside city
limits, it did not appear to be of an urban nature.
147. 245 Ark. 487, 432 S.W.2d 865 (1968).
148. Id. at 490, 432 S.W.2d at 866.
149. 255 Ark. 217, 499 S.W.2d 852 (1973).
150. Id. at 222, 499 S.W.2d at 856.
151. 269 Ark. 862, 601 S.W.2d 265 (Ct. App. 1980).
152. Id. at 864, 601 S.W.2d at 266.
153. Id. at 865, 601 S.W.2d at 266-67.
154. Id. at 864, 601 S.W.2d at 267.
155. 269 Ark. 907, 601 S.W.2d 254 (Ct. App. 1980).
156. Id. at 911,601 S.W.2d at 256.
157. 7 Ark. App. 110, 644 S.W.2d 615 (1983).
158. Id. at 112-15, 644 S.W.2d at 616-17.
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V. THE ADOPTION OF A NEW RULE IN MISSOURI
In 1884 Missouri adopted a modified common enemy rule, just two
years after the Arkansas decision in Chapman. In the original decision,
Abbott v. Kansas City, St. Joseph & Council Bluffs Railroad,'59 the Missouri
court suggested that "reasonable care and prudence" were necessary in
dealing with surface water--either guarding against it or diverting it from
the premises. 6 '
Subsequent decisions continued to apply mitigating
exceptions but by 1990 the Missouri Court of Appeals conceded that the
precedents "cannot be reconciled.' 16 1 It was suggested that upper landown62
ers must exercise some degree of care in discharging water to lower lands.
Lower landowners, however, could block the flow coming onto their
property unless they blocked a natural drainway.163 In 1993 the Missouri
Supreme Court was confronted with a situation not clearly addressed by
either line of cases. In Heins Implement Co. v. Missouri Highway &
Transportation Commission (MHTC),'" landowners sued MHTC after a
highway bypass project caused flooding on their property.165 A culvert had
been constructed to handle normal drainage, but in periods of heavy rain the
66
bypass acted as a dam, pooling water on the land of the plaintiffs.1
MHTC claimed that its action involved neither "the collection and
67
discharge of surface waters, nor the blocking of a natural drainway."'1
MHTC argued that prior cases imposed a duty only on upper landowners
who discharged collected waters and not on lower landowners who "merely
dammed surface water to keep it away from their own property.' 68
The Missouri court reviewed the history of the civil law rule and the
common enemy rule and their modifications and concluded:
Predictably, neither of these rigid doctrines has proved workable in the
real world. In short order each was encrusted with a myriad of mitigating
159. 83 Mo. 271 (1884).
160. Id. at 280-81.
161. See Brown v. H & D Duenne Farms, Inc., 799 S.W.2d 621, 628 (Mo. Ct. App.
1990).
162. See Hansen v. Gary Naugle Const. Co., 801 S.W.2d 71 (Mo. 1990) (holding that
upper landowners may discharge onto lower landowners if the discharge is through a natural
drain, the flow does not exceed the capacity of the natural drain, and the upper landowner
acts without negligence); Looney v. Hindman, 649 S.W.2d 207 (Mo. 1983) (holding upper
landowners to substantial restrictions in discharging water onto lower landowners).
163. Happy v. Kenton, 247 S.W.2d 698, 701 (Mo. 1952).
164. 859 S.W.2d 681 (Mo. 1993).
165. Heins Implement Co., 859 S.W.2d at 684.

166. Id.
167. Id. at 687.
168. Id.
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exceptions, in some cases harsh and capricious and in most cases
confusing and unpredictable. Perhaps the most telling fact is that courts
applying these ostensibly opposite rules often reach similar results.'69
The court then reviewed the reasonable use rule and its dual nature as
a distinct property law concept and as a tort, a form of nuisance. 70 Because
reasonableness is a question of fact, the "thrust and elements" were the same
regardless of how the rule was viewed. 7' The court concluded that "the
common enemy doctrine, even as modified, has outlived its usefulness in
our state." Therefore, the court adopted the reasonable use rule "as the one
most likely to promote the optimum development and enjoyment of land,
while ensuring that their true costs are equitably distributed among the
competing interests at hand."' 2
The court was persuaded that the reasonable use rule's "harsh origins
and labyrinth of exceptions" were unduly complicated and confusing.'73
Furthermore, the reasonable use rule was consistent with not only "the most
basic tenets of our law" but with concepts governing the rights of users of
water generally.'74 The court applied the newly adopted rule to the facts in
Heins Implement and suggested that unreasonable diversion of surface water,
75
by design or mistake, would be actionable.
VI. THE LESSON FOR ARKANSAS

The Missouri decision provides a cogent argument for adopting the
reasonable use approach-one that should be considered by the Arkansas
courts if the opportunity presents itself, as it surely will. One of the major
advantages of the reasonable use approach is that it allows each case to be
determined on its facts. The Missouri court explained that courts could
then make decisions, "in accordance with general principles of fairness and
common sense."'7

6

Such a rule does not specify rigid rights and privileges

with respect to surface water, but rather allows analysis as a form of
nuisance. The Restatement (Second) of Torts states that: "[a]n invasion of
one's interest in the use and enjoyment of land resulting from another's

169.
170.
171.
172.
173.
174.
175.
176.

Id. at 689.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 690-91.
Id.
Id. at 691.
Id.
Id. at 689.
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'
interference with the flow of surface water may constitute a nuisance." 77
Under the Restatement, liability may be imposed if conduct is either (1)
intentional and unreasonable or (2) negligent, reckless, or in the course of
an abnormally dangerous activity.'
In Arkansas, this approach has some appeal because of the potential
divergence of approaches in using the common enemy rule in agricultural
situations (modified) and urban areas (possibly unmodified). Also, it is
unclear which rule actually applies to fending off floodwaters as opposed to
fending off usual runoff from rainfall. The reasonable use rule would be
applicable in all situations. These subtle distinctions, if they do exist, would
be of no consequence.
The adoption of a reasonable use rule would bring Arkansas's law into
accord with the law in an emerging number of states that have adopted the
reasonable use rule outright.'79 One logical reason for the movement toward
the reasonable use rule is mentioned in the Missouri case. Such a move
would bring into one classification all water-related rules. 8 ' Because the
reasonable use test is used to judge the actions of one taking water from a
stream or lake or from underground wells and is also the test applied to
determine liability for interfering with flow in a watercourse, it seems
appropriate to evaluate actions dealing with diffused surface water using the
same test. Further, the application of nuisance theory is a concept quite
familiar to the courts. As stated by the Missouri court, "[r]easonableness is
the vital principle of the common law."''
As indicated earlier, another convincing reason exists as to why it
might be appropriate for Arkansas to adopt a new rule. The original rule in
Chapman was adopted under a faulty premise. The court in Chapman
emphasized the necessity of following the common law, even citing the
reception statute and asserting that it could not logically depart from the
common law as expressed in English decisions. The rule that the court says
it was not authorized to depart' from, however, was not necessarily the

177. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 833 (1979).
178. Id. § 822.
179. Heins Implement Co., 859 S.W.2d at 689 n.13 (citing cases from various
jurisdictions such as Alaska, Connecticut, Florida, Hawaii, Kentucky, Massachusetts,
Minnesota, Mississippi, Nevada, New Hampshire, New Jersey, North Carolina, North Dakota,
Ohio, Rhode Island, Utah, West Virginia, Wisconsin (and now, Missouri) as following the
reasonable use approach. Arkansas, Oklahoma, South Carolina and Virginia are cited as
having modified the common enemy doctrine by adding a reasonableness requirement.
Apparently, California, Illinois, Idaho, Iowa, and Maryland have added a reasonableness
requirement to the civil law rule. Other states either follow one of the traditional rules,
unmodified, or have introduced other combinations).
180. Id. at 691.
181. Id. at 691 (quoting City of Franklin v. Durgee, 51 A. 911, 913 (1901)).
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common law rule or at least not the English common law rule. Evidence
exists to suggest that, if anything, the English common law rule was akin
to the civil law doctrine. The common enemy doctrine, referred to in
Chapman as the common law rule was based on a strong view of the rights
associated with absolute ownership of land. The English rule, to the extent
that it was settled, may have favored the civil law approach. 182 As pointed
out by the Missouri court in Heins Implement, the English law of surface
waters was unsettled at the time the common enemy doctrine appeared in
American jurisprudence.183 Apparently, the common enemy doctrine
appeared in this country in a series of Massachusetts cases beginning in
185 1.184 The term common enemy is of English origin and referred to legal
attitudes towards the sea.' 85 However, authority exists which suggests that
the English courts had in no way adopted the rule to apply to surface
drainage.' 86
Perhaps this is of some importance in states like Arkansas, which
adopted the common law by a reception statute."' Of course, the fact that
the modified common enemy rule has been followed for more than 100
years makes it, nevertheless, the rule for decision. But, a modem court
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